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In this paper the impact of information provision to travelIers using a model
based on a stochastic equilibrium concept is analysed. A new analytical frame-
work is proposed by inc1uding a specific term related to the costs of travel-time
uncertainty, per se, into the generalised cost function. Different driver informa-
tion models are analysed to assess the efficiency-improving features of driver
information systems compared with the (optimal) first-best policy of road
pricing. The resu1ts reveal that the potentialof driver information systems as an
efficiency-improving policy instrument are underestimated if costs of uncer-
tainty are ignored.
1. INTRODUCTION
The congestion-relieving properties of providing drivers with traffic information
have recently gained much interest, both in the public and academie domain. In the
U.S.A., the E.U. and Japan, special research programmes are dedicated to investi-
gating the impact of so-called telematics, while at the same time private firms are
investing a significant amount of money to develop the necessary tools for imple-
menting these technologies. As the feasibility of adding capacity to the existing
infrastructure by means of building new roads is regarded to be rather low (due to
environmental and financial concerns), emphasis has moved to using the current
infrastructure as efficiently as possible (Boyce 1988; Emmerink et al., 1994).
Besides the provision of traffic information, road pricing is one of the other
available instruments to improve the efficiency of existing infrastructure. In fact, a
fluctuating road-pricing scheme (fluctuating with the level of congestion) can be
shown to be the so-called first-best instrument in theory, since it is able to give
drivers the financial incentive to behave (system) optimally. However, the political
and social feasibility of road pricing has often been questioned (Emmerink et al.,
1995a; Johansson and Mattsson 1995). On the other hand, the provision of traffic
information is a second-best instrument. It cannot be proven that information
*Manuscript received July 1995; final revision September 1996.
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1 This paper has benefited from the comments by three anonymous referees.
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provision will always lead to system-optimal road usage. In contrast, due to the
existence of transport extemalities, such as congestion, pollution, and safety, this
will generally not be the case. However, owing to its user friendliness, public and
political support for introducing information technologies in transport networks
exceeds the backing of road pricing by faro
From an economie perspective, a thorough analysis of the discrepancy in effi-
ciency between these first- and second-best instruments is essential. In this paper we
will do so by focusing on two points. In Section 2, the welfare economie properties
of information provision are analysed by answering the question: Does information
provision lead to a strict Pareto improvement? Secondly, in Section 3, and related to
the first point, attention is paid to the size of potential efficiency gains due to the
provision of traffic information. This should lead to a better understanding of the
key factors that determine the efficiency impact of driver information. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
This paper complements the work by Emmerink et al. (1996a, 1996b, 1996
(forthcoming)) by including a term related to the costs of travel-time uncertainty
into the generalised cost function. In so doing, the model presented hereafter gains
much in realism, as the importance of uncertainty costs has frequently been stressed
in the literature (Arnott et al., 1990, Hendrickson and Kocur 1981, Noland et al.,
1994). Furthermore, the work in this paper advances work by Arnott et al. (1991,
1996) in two respects. First, besides public information we also consider the case of
club information. Club information deals with the situation in which only a specific
group of travellers is provided with information. Second, attention will be paid to
endogenous information provision, implying that travellers will acquire information
only if the private benefits of the information exceed the private costs. Arnott et al.
(1991, 1996) assumed that information is available for free for the whole population.
The analysis in this paper is applied to information in transport networks. Clearly,
the analysis can be used for any congestible facility. One could, for instanee, think of
when and where to go on a potentially crowded beach; telephone calls in a
congested communication network; and information on congested computer net-
works such as the Internet.
2. STOCHASTIC NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM MODELS WITH INFORMATION
AND COSTS OF UNCERTAINTY
In this section, four models for road use in which drivers take costs of uncertainty
into account are presented. Previous work (see Arnott et al., 1996, and Emmerink
et al., 1996a) considered the case in which travel costs were solely determined by
stochastic costs related to travel time. Costs resulting from uncertainty or risk were
not explicitly considered. Here, it is assumed that travellers base their behaviour on
the following generalised cost function:
(1) E( travelcosts) = ex· E( traveltime) + f3' Sd( traveltime)
where Sd indicates the standard deviation of the stochastic variabie traveltime, and
E denotes the expectation operator. The parameters ex and f3 can be interpreted as
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the monetary value-of-time and value-of-uncertainty (or oalue-of-risk), respectively.
This type of generalised cost function has previously been considered in the
transportation literature; see for example, Arnott et al., (1990), Hendrickson and
Kocur (1981), Noland and Small (1995), and Small (1982). These authors stressed
the importance of including costs related to travel-time uncertainty in a generalised
travel cost function. Empirical work revealed the important role played by uncer-
tainty in travel behaviour. More precisely, the term f3. Sditracel time) in equation (1)
refers to planning costs that uncertainty in travel time imposes on individuals. For
instance,one could think of costs associated with disruption of meetings with
coworkers, stress, and so forth (Noland et al., 1994). Such costs make individuals
effectively risk-averse with respect to travel time. In economie terms, the model
assumes that travellers have rational expectations of the first and second moments of
the travel-time distribution. In other words, drivers perceive the correct mean and
varianee of the travel-time distribution. For peak-hour travelIers it seems reasonable
to assume that drivers have no misperceptions of either expected travel time or its
varianee thereof.
In order to confine the analysis to relevant situations the parameter f3 is
restricted to values within the interval [0, ex J. First, negative f3-values would imply
risk-Ioving travelling behaviour; something that is rather unrealistic in the context of
travel-time valuation. Second, f3-values exceeding ex would imply that reducing the
uncertainty by a number of minutes is worth more than a reduction in travel time by
the same amount. In the sequel, values of f3 greater than ex will only be used for
purely illustrative purposes. 2 In addition, the size of the f3-parameter is also
restricted by the observation that it is rather unrealistic to assume that the expected
travel costs under uncertainty exceed the highest possible travel costs without
uncertainty.
Four models will be described, representing four different starting points concern-
ing the availability of information. In each of these, travelIers are seeking to
optimise the generalised costs of travelling. As we have imposed the assumption of
rational expectations in terms of first and second moments of the travel-time
distribution, the potential adverse effects of information provision due to over-
reaction (Ben-Akiva et al., 1991) are ruled out. In contrast with the present study, in
simulation studies drivers' behaviour has generally been modelled using simple
behavioural rules. In those modeis, overreaction might play an important role as the
rational expectations assumption is not necessarily implied by those rules (Emmerink
et al., 1995, Mahmassani and Jayakrishman ·1991, Noland 1995).
In the first model, indicated as model N, there is no information available to the
road users, and travellers base their trip-making decisions on expected travel costs.
In the second model, model I, information on the actual traffic costs is available to
all road users. Consequently, these will consider actual rather than expectedcosts in
their trip-making decision. In the third model, denoted as model P, information is
2 In fact, travellers with extremely large penalty casts for lateness might have a value of f3 that
exceeds a. However, it seems rather unlikely that the whole population of potential travellers
exhibits such extreme risk-averse behaviour.
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available to an exogenously determined fraction of the road users. Finally, in model
E, information is modelled .endogenously. In this model, the traveller's choice of
being informed depends on the private benefits and private costs associated with the
information. Drivers will then acquire traffic information when the internal private
benefits derived from the information exceed the costs of information.
In the past, several studies have introduced stochasticity in the context of road
transportation. For stochasticity in travel demand see, for example, d'Ouville and
McDonald (1990), and Kay (1979). Stochasticity in capacity has been considered by
Arnott et al. (1991, 1996), De Vany and Saving (1977), Emmerink et al., (1996a,
1996b, forthcoming), and Verhoef et al., 1996. We follow this trend and apply a
recently developed methodology that explicitly treats travel time as random vari-
ables (Emmerink et al., 1995b). Uncertainty originates from stochastic shocks in the
cost function. Information, then, provides traveIlers with realisations of these
random variables. In order to keep the model tractable, it is assumed that the
stochastic travel time functions follow a Bernoulli distribution. With probability
(1 - p) the travel time function is given by CO(N), while with probability p travel
time is given ~by C1(N), where N denotes the level of road usage. As both CO(N)
and C1(N) reflect travel time, these are increasing functions in N. The two
realisations of the stochastic travel time variables are referred to as state 0 (CO(N))
and state 1 (C 1(N)). State 1 reflects the situation with lowcapacity (e.g., due to
traffic accidents, .road works, unpredicted lane closures); in state 0 capacity is
relatively high. Research by De Rose (1964), Giuliano (1989), Golob et al. (1987),
Hall (1993) and Lindley (1987) has emphasized the need to model stochastic,
unpredictable congestion explicitly. '
The relation between the travel time in state 0 (high capacity) and state 1 (low
capacity) can be written as:
(2) aCO(N) aC
1(N)
--- < for all N> 0
aN aN
Hence, evaluated at a given number of road users, both the travel time itself and the
rate at which average travel time increases with an additional road user is higher
under state 1.
Before presenting the four models in detail, a final remark concerns the elasticity
of travel demand. In the models it is assumed that demand for using the transport
network is elastic; this in contrast with most of the well-known work that makes use
of the bottleneck model, where demand is assumed to be fixed (Al-Deek and
Kanafani 1993,Arnott et al., 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994).4 In our model, the situation of
fixed demand is just the limiting case where the elasticity of the demand function
approaches zero. The inverse demand function is given by D(N), that is, at a cost
level K, we postulate that D -1( K) road users will use the network.
3 In the transportation literature, this type of congestion is known as nonrecurrent congestion.
4A few researchers have paid some attention to the case of elastic demand. See, for example,
Arnott et al. (1993), and Ben-Akiva et al. (1986).
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2.1. Model N: No Information Available. In order to implement the model
based on individual optimising behaviour following equation [1], an expression for
the standard deviation of the stochastic travel times is needed. By defining C=
(1 - p)CO+pCl, it can easily be shown that:
(3) Var( traveltime) = (1 - p) . (CO - C) 2 +p- (Cl - C) 2
=p'(1-p) "(C l - CO)2
where Var indicates the varianee operator. It follows that:
(4) Sd( traveltime) = JP"(1 - p) . (Cl - CO)
because, by construction, Cl > CO, see expression [2].
The equilibrium condition for model N, where no information is available, is then
given by:
(5) a'((1-p)'CO(NN)-P'CI(NN))
+{3·Jp·(1-p) . (CI(NN) - CO(NN)) =D(NN)
where NN denotes the equilibrium level of road usage of model N. The subscript is
used to distinguish the equilibrium levels of road usage from this model with the
ones to be presented hereafter. The left-hand side of expression [5] gives the
expected travel costs, while the right-hand side denotes the willingness-to-pay for
using the transport network. Clearly, for the marginal network user NN' expected
private costs should equal private benefits: he or she is indifferent between using the
network or not.
Using the following explicit linear functions for Ci(N) and D(N):
(1)
(2) D(N) =d-aN,
the equilibrium level of road usage NN is given by:
(6)
where a bar indicates an expected value. As expected, an increase in the value-of-time
(a) and the value-of-uncertainty ({3) leads to a decrease of NNI
2.2. Model L' Information Available for All Travellers. In model I it is as-
sumed that all potential road users are perfectly informed on the actual traffic
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situation. This implies that the travelIers base their trip-making decision on actual
rather than expected costs (as opposed to model N), and do not face any costs
related to travel time uncertainty. The two equilibrium conditions that describe the
model are given by:
(7)
(8)
These conditions reveal that for the marginal network users NIO (when state 0
occurs) and NJ (when state 1 occurs) private costs are equal to private benefits in
both states. Marginal user NJ is indifferent between using the network in both
states or just in state 0, while marginal user NIO is indifferent between using the
network in state 0 or not using it at all. The parameter f3 plays no role in these
expressions, since informed drivers do not face uncertainty costs. Clearly, there is no
interaction between NIO and NJ as the road users are perfectly aware of the actual
traffic conditions in model I.
When comparing models N and I, it can be shown that NN < NIO. Regarding NJ,
two regimes can be distinguished:
(1)
(2)
NJ < NN <NIO: for relatively small f3;
NN < NJ <NIO: for relatively large f3.
An analysis of the properties of model N and model I, under the condition of linear
demand and travel time functions, leads to Proposition 1, containing the most
important results of a welfare theoretical comparison of the two modeIs.
PROPOSITION 1. In a one-link network assuming linear demand and cost functions,
and assuming that expression [2] holds, then due to information to all travellers:
(1) expected road usage increases; (2) expected network travel costs decrease; (3) none of
the road users is worse of! and consequently, the system welfare in model I does not fall
short of system welfare in model N.
PROOF. Available upon request from the authors.
Some implications of Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2. On
the x-axis, the travelIers are ranked according to decreasing willingness-to-pay,
while on the y-axis the additional expected net private benefits (owing to informa-
tion provision) are shown. The additional expected net private benefits are defined
as the expected "net private benefits for model I minus the expected net private
benefits for model N. Using the assumptions of linear demand and cost functions, it
can be shown that the additional expected net private benefits look either like
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Net Private Benefits
D(NN)-( l-p)D(N?)-pD(N)
(l-p)(D(N)-D~»
(l-p)(D(~)-D(~» ,.............................. .. ..
DCNN}-D(B(N1» ..-------~
L--------~---_-------.;lto.----N
o
FIGURE 1
MODEL N AND I: CASE Ni < NN < Nl
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Figure 1 or like Figure 2.5 The kinks in these figures occur at the levels of road
usage that are given by the solutions of the equations [5], [7], and [8], respectively. At
these 'solution levels' of road usage regime switches are taking place. For instance,
travellers on the left-hand side of NN will use the network in model N, while
travellers on the right-hand side of NN do not use the network in model N.
Similarly, travellers on the left-hand side of Ni use the network in both states in
model I; travellers in the interval (Ni, NlO) use the network only in state 0 in
model I, while travellers on the right-hand side of Nl O do not use the network
in model I.
Some observations are in order. First, depending on whether Ni is smaller
or larger than NN' most benefits from information provision accrue to either
travellers in segment III and some of those in IIII (in Figure 1), or those in
segment 12 (in Figure 2). Second, the benefits depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are
the sum of the so-called intemal and extemal individual benefits. External benefits
are beneficial effects to a particular traveller due to changes in trip-making deci-
sions by other travellers. For example, following Proposition 1, travellers who-
independent of the state of the network-always use the transport network in both
model N and model I gain from a decrease in expected network travel costs. This is
an example of an extemal benefit. However, travellers who have different trip-
making decisions in model N and model I (for example, those in the interval
5 The ordinate values on the y-axis of Figure 1 and Figure 2 can be easily derived. For instanee,
the additional expected net private benefits of model I minus model N for travelIer NN follow from
the following calculation:
Expected private casts in model N for travelIer NNare given by D(NN), see equation [5].
Expected private casts in model I for travelIer NN are given by (1 .,p)D(Nl) + pD(NN), see
equations [7] and [8]. (pD(NN) in state 1 as in state 1 travelIer NN will not use the network.)
Hence, the decrease in expected travel casts between model I and model N is given by:
D(NN) - «1-p)D(Nl) + pD(NN)) = (1 - p)(D(NN) - D(Nl)).
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Net Private Benefits
D(NN)-D(E(N1))
D(Nl )-D(E(N[ »
D(N)-D(E(NI »
...-------"""""':["........1 (l-p)(D(N)-D~»
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............
FIGURE2
MODEL N AND I: CASE NN < Ni < Nl
(Ni, NlO) in Figure 1) benefit from internal decision-making benefits. This means
that due to the information provided these travellers respond to the different levels
of congestion (state 0 and state 1) by means of altering their trip-making decision.
The distinction between intemal and external benefits is important as it reveals that
(rational) travellers are not willing to pay the whole amount of their additional
expected net private benefits to become informed. For example, drivers in segment
/1 are not necessarily prepared to pay the whole amount of their information
benefits, that is, D(NN) -D(E(Nl ) ) , to acquire information. Part of their informa-
tion benefits is extemal in nature and is caused by changes in behaviour by other
road users. In fact, drivers in segment /1 are willing to pay a maximum of
(9)
to become informed. This amount represents the monetary costs of uncertainty that
they are faced with. Furthermore, as theoretically shown in Emmerink et al. (1996a)
and Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985), the marginal effect of information decreases
with the fraction of users who are informed. Simulation experiments by Mahmassani
and Jayakrishnan (1991) led to even stronger results. They showed that information
benefits might actually become negative as the fraction of informed road users
exceeded a particular threshold value. The theoretical model presented here,
however, shows that the system welfare (measured as the sum of the individual
benefits minus the sum of the individual costs) in model/does not fall short of the
system welfare in model N (see Proposition 1). In other words, information
increases network efficiency.
Figure 1 was also discussed in Emmerink, Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld
(1996a), where no costs of uncertainty were considered ({3 = 0). When including
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monetary costs of uncertainty (f3 > 0) however, the pattem of benefit distribution
may change to the one shown in Figure 2 for sufficiently high values of f3.
2.3. Model P: Information Available for an Exogenously Determined Group of
Travellers. Thus far, it was assumed that either none (model N) or all (model I)
potential road users are supplied with information on the actual traffic situation.
Next, in model P, it is assumed that information is provided to an exogenously
determined group of potential road users denoted by subscript i (referring to
informed), while uninformed travellers are denoted by subscript u. Respective
inverse demand functions for these two groups of potential road users are given by
D;(Np,i) and Du(Np,u)' where as before a capital N indicates the level ofroad usage
and the subscript Prefers to the model under consideration. From these two
groups, informed road users are perfectly aware of the prevailing (actual) travel
costs and consequently do not face any uncertainty regarding the prevailing travel
time; the cost component with the standard deviation is equal to zero. On the other
hand, uninformed potential road users are not aware of any day-specific travel costs
and base their behaviour on expected rather than actual costs. The three equilibrium
conditions that fully describe model Pare given in expressions [10] to [12].
(10) a·CO(Nj,i+Np,u)=D;(Nj,;)
(11) a·C I(N),i +Np,u) =D;(N),i)
(12) a· ((1 - p). CO(Nj,; + Np,u) +p. C I ( N),; + Np,u))
+ f3. Vp· (1 - p) . (C 1( N),; + Np,u) - CO( Nj,; + Np,u)) = Du(Np,u)
Equilibrium conditions [10] and [11] state the equality between private costs and
private benefits for the informed marginal network users Nl i (when state 0 occurs)
and N),; (when state 1 occurs), The third equilibrium condition reflects the equality
between expected private costs and private benefits for the uninformed marginal
network user Np,u; network user Np,u is indifferent between using the network or
not.
In order to assess the welfare economie properties of model P, its features are
compared with model N. To do so, model N is first presented for two groups of
drivers. The equilibrium conditions of this model are straightforward:
(13) a· ((1 - p). CoC NN,i + NN,u) +P' C I ( NN,i+ NN,u))
+ f3. Vp· (1- p) . (C I(NN,i + NN,u) - CO(NN,; + NN,u)) = Di(NN,i)
(14) a· ((1 - p).C~,i+ NN,u) +P ·C I(NN,i + NN,u))
+ f3. Vp· (1 - p) . (C I ( NN,i + NN,u) - CoC NN,{+ NN,u)) = Du(NN,u)
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Clearly, the former group of 'informed' potential road users in model P is here also
basing its behaviour on expected costs; see expression [13]. Using the linear demand
and stochastic link travel time functions, the properties of model Pand model N
are given by Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2. In a one-link network assuming linear demand and cost functions,
and assuming that expression [2] holds, then as a result of information provision to an
exogenously determined group of traveilers: (1) total expected road usage increases;
(2) expected road usage of the group of informed traveilers increases; (3) expected
network travel costs of the group of informed .traveilers decreases; (4) none of the
travelIersof the informed group is worse of! and consequently, welfare for the informed
travelIersdoes not decrease.
PROOF. Available upon request from the authors.
There are many similarities between Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. However,
there is one important difference. Proposition 2 does not address the welfare
economie effects of the information provision to the uninformed travellers. In fact,
in model P it is impossible to prove that welfare of uninformed travellers will not
decrease. The illustration in Figure 3, which gives the results of a simulation
experiment with model N and model P, shows that under certain conditions welfare
of uninformed drivers decreases; in particular, if the value of uncertainty f3 is
sufficiently high.
·41
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2.520.5 1 1.5
Value-of-Uncertainty (B)
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-Ä- Model P (inforrned)
FIGURE3
EXPECTED NETWORK TRAVEL COSTS IN MODEL N AND P
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In Figure 3, the expected network travel costs are depicted as a function of the
value-of-uncertainty parameter f3.6 As proven in Proposition 2, informed road users
are better off with information. However, this is not necessarily true for the
uninformed ones. As can be seen in Figure 3, with the given parameter values, when
f3 gets beyond f3 ~ 1.8 (which exceeds a), the uninformed road users are worse off
with information provision. This can be explained as follows. First, notice that the
value-of-time and value-of-uncertainty parameters are assumed to be identical for
all potential road users, both informed and uninformed. Clearly, as the informed
drivers do not face travel time uncertainty, the uncertainty component becomes zero
in their expected travel cost function; see expressions [10] and [11]. This, in turn, will
lead to a larger number of informed travelIers using the network. The increase
will be larger with high values of f3. As a consequence, network travel times will
increase, which leads to larger expected travel costs for the uninformed road users.
On the left-hand side of Figure 3 at {3 = 0, uninformed drivers are absolutely certain
to benefit from the information provision to informed drivers, results which have
been derived in Emmerink et .al., (1996a).
In the literature, several authors have called attention to the potential negative
effects of information provision for uninformed drivers; see for example Bonsall and
Parry (1990). However, those assertions were often based on qualitative analyses.
Our formal analysis indicates that under the provision of perfect- information, some
of the uninformed road users might be worse off when the costs of uncertainty ( f3 )
are very high. With a more realistic value-of-uncertainty parameter, however, this is
unlikely to take place.
2.4. Model E: Information Available for an Endogenously Determined Group
of Travellers. In model E it is assumed that the choice of being informed depends
on the internal private benefits derived from the information and the private costs
of being informed. In contrast to the previous two modeis, it is now assumed that
information is a commodity that can be purchased for a fixed price tt, where the
price tt refers to the costs of the necessary information equipment and the costs of
the subscription to information services. In this model, potential road users are
faced with two decisions: either to use the network or not, and either to buy the
information or not. Clearly, these decisions are interdependent,?
Due to the static equilibrium nature of the models discussed in this paper, the
price of information tt to be considered here lacks any time dimension. In other
words, whereas one would intuitively think of tt as an individual investment, the
internal benefits of which were to be reaped during a subsequent (large) number of
travel decisions, such reasoning is not in the spirit of static equilibrium analysis.
Hence, for the translation of the model into more practical terms, one should
interpret 11' as the daily equivalent of some purchase price II, where 'TT reflects daily
interest and depreciation.
6 Based on previous work (Emmerink et al., 1996a), the following parameters were used to
produce Figure 3: di = du = 50, ai = au = 0.03, p = 0.25,kO = k l = 20, bO = 0.015,bI = 0.04, a = 1.
7 Without including costs of uncertainty, endogenous provision of information was dealt with in
Emmerink et al., (1996b).
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Before deriving the equilibrium conditions of model E, a final remark is worth
making. Without loss of generality, only parameter values leading to at least a few
travellers acquiring information are considered. This assumption allows us to write
the equilibrium conditions of the model in terms of equalities. If none of the
travellers is willing to buy the information (either because the price 'TT is too high or
the stochasticity in the network is too low, i.e., p-values close to zero or one) then
the model simply collapses to model N (see Section 2.1).
It is not straightforward to derive the equilibrium conditions for this model. Let
us first split up the group of potential road users into four parts, as in Figure 1.
Road users in segment 11 will always use the network, independent of the state of
the network. For these drivers, information reduces their uncertainty costs to zero.
Since the expected costs of the uncertainty are identical for these drivers, either all
or none of the road users in segment 11 will acquire information depending on the
price of the information.
Next, consider the road users in segment Il-: Without being provided with
information, they will always use the network, and therefore face travel costs related
to both travel time and uncertainty. However, when provided with information, they
will only use the network in state 0; their private benefits in state 1 fall short of their
private costs in this state. Therefore, information will allow these drivers to reduce
the costs of uncertainty to zero, and in addition, will provide them with decision-
making benefits in state 1. In fact, the benefits in state 1 stem from the possibility of
avoiding network use when capacity is low. A comparison of the information
benefits of drivers from segment 11 and III shows that segment III drivers benefit
more than drivers from segment 11 in Figure 1.
Now, we turn to the road users in segment 1111• When they base their trip-making
behaviour on expected costs, these will exceed the private benefits of using the
network. Therefore, they will not use the network when not provided with informa-
tion. This also implies that drivers in segment 1111 do not face any costs related to
uncertainty. When road users from segment 1111 are informed on the actual network
conditions, they will decide to use the network only when state 0 prevails. These
drivers will thus obtain individual benefits from improved decision-making. Finally,
the hypothetical road users of segment /VI will never use the network, nor will they
therefore buy the information.
To derive the equilibrium conditions of model E, we have to distinguish between
two different situations. First, let us assume that for drivers in segment 11 and 12 it
is not beneficial to be equipped with the information device. This implies that:
(15)
The above inequality shows that the benefits of being informed do not offset the
costs of acquiring the information for drivers who will always use the network, and
therefore, it ensures that drivers in segment 11 and 12 will not buy the information.
The equilibrium conditions of model E under the assumption that inequality [15]
holds can now be given:
(16) (1- p). (D(N~) - a·CO(N~)) = 'TT
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The term in the big parentheses in expression [16] denotes the net internal private
benefits to driver N~ from segment ///1 in state O. Multiplied by the probability of
occurrence, 1 - p, the left-hand side of expression [16] gives the net private benefits
of informed road usage experienced by the informed driver Ni. To ensure that
driver Ni is the marginal informed driver, the net benefits should equal the costs of
acquiring the information 'TT.
The first term in the big parentheses of expression [17] denotes the net private
benefits to informed drivers in segment //1' accruing from the fact that they are not
using the network in state 1 when provided with information. Remember that
without being provided with information, drivers from segment //1 would always
decide to use the network. The expected value of these benefits is obtained by
multiplying this term with the probability of occurrence of state 1, p. The second
term of expression [17] gives the benefits of avoiding the costs of uncertainty.
Without being provided with information, these drivers would always use the
network and therefore suffer from uncertainty costs. To ensure that driver Ni is the
marginal informed driver of segment //1' the intemal private benefits from being
provided with information should equal the costs of information 'TT. This then leaves
us with expression [17]. Notice that in expression [17] the equilibrium levels of road
usage N~ and Ni interact in the term that relates to the costs of uncertainty.
Now, consider the case that inequality [15] does not hold, and hence:
(18)
This implies that all drivers in segment /1 and /2 will acquire information, since the
benefits owing to the information exceed the costs of buying the information. Under
this assumption, the marginal informed driver Ni in segment /2 is now marginal in
the sense that he or she is indifferent between using the network in both states or
just in state 0 when provided with information. Remember that for inequality [15] to
hold, the marginal informed driver Ni is indifferent between either using the
network in both states and not buying the information or using the network in
state 0 and buying the information. Under inequality [18], however, marginal driver
Ni is not indifferent between buying information or not. He or she will buy
information as the benefits of avoiding the travel time uncertainty already offset the
costs of acquiring the information; see inequality [18]. The two equilibrium condi-
tions that fully determine N~ and Ni· are now given by expressions [19] and [20]:
(19)
(20)
(1- p). (D(N~) - a·CO(Ni)) = 'TT
Expression [19] is similar to expression [16]. Expression [20], however, is different
from expression [17]. Equilibrium condition [20] ensures that the informed traveller
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Ni is indifferent between either using the network in both states or in state 0 solely:
the left-hand side represents the costs of using the network in state 1, while the
right-hand side denotes the costs of not using the network in state 1.8
A comparison of the properties of model N and model E, under the assumption
of linear demand and stochastic travel time functions, leads to Proposition 3:
PROPOSITION 3. In a one-link network assuming linear demand and cost functions,
and assuming that expression [2] holds, then as a result of endogenous provision of
information: (1) expected road usage increases; (2) for all road users expected network
travel costs do not increase; (3) none of the travellers is worse oft and consequently, the
system welfare in model E does not fall short of system welfare in model N.
PROOF. Available upon request from the authors.
With respect to the third point of Proposition 3, it can be shown that the
additional net expected private benefits resulting from the endogenous provision of
information (net expected private benefits of model E minus net expected private
benefits of model N) have a similar pattern as the curves in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Of course, subscript I has to be replaced by subscript E.
It is important to note that the negative external effects to uninformed road users
are now not taking place. Even for very large values of {3, uninformed road users
are benefiting from the endogenous provision of information. Au obvious explana-
tion for this difference between model Pand model E is that the negatively
affected uninformed road users of model P would buy the information in model E
to ensure that they will also benefit from the information.
To conclude, in the previous sections various stochastic network equilibrium
models were analysed. It was proven that information leads to a Pareto improve-
ment for the informed drivers, so none of the informed drivers is worse off due to
information. In model P, however, uninformed travellers might be negatively
affected by information, but this is unlikely to happen with realistic parameter
values. Finally, in model E, where the choice of being informed is endogenous, it
was shown that travellers who decide not to acquire information will always be
better off. Therefore, a preliminary conclusion of the analysis is that information
will lead to a strict Pareto improvement.
It should be stressed, however, that the results obtained are to some extent
dependent on the assumed functional forms of demand and cost functions. For
example, Verhoef et al., (1996) have shown that information provision may induce
welfare losses when a kinked demand curve is used. Furthermore, concerning the
supply-side of the system, it can be shown that even with linear cost functions
welfare losses due .to information provision occur under the unrealistic assumption
8 Notice that equation [17] collapses to equation [20] if
Hence, in this situation the two cases discussed are identical.
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that the slope of the cost function in state 0 is larger than the slope of the cost
function in state 1.
3. INFORMATION PROVISION AND SYSTEM OPTIMAL BEHAVIOUR
Information provision is a second-best policy; provision of information does not
necessarily direct the network performance to system optimal (first-best) levels. In
the present section, the analysis is focused on the efficiency of endogenous informa-
tion provision relative to the optimal policy. The level of welfare generated by
endogenous information provision is compared with welfare of the optimal policy
and welfare of the nonintervention policy, respectively. The nonintervention policy
considered is given by model N. The optimal (welfare-maximising) policy is pre-
sented in Section 3.1. The welfare effects of endogenous information provision are
then investigated in Section 3.2.
3.1. System Optimum tPirst-best) Policy. The theoretical concept of road
pncmg, stemming from Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924), and further explored by
Walters (1961), Smeed (1964), Sharp (1966), and Vickrey (1969, 1971), is based on
levying a tax equal to the difference of the marginal social costs and marginal
private costs (Pigouvian tax), In doing so, the negative extemal effects on other road
users when joining a road are accounted for in the user's decision-making process:
the system optimum will coincide with the user equilibrium (Wardrop 1952). In
economie terms, the road price ensures that only economically efficient trips are
undertaken."
In this section, the theory of road pricing is extended to situations in which road
users suffer from costs related to uncertainty. A system optimal policy can be
implemented by means of a fluctuating (depending on the state) pricing scheme;
fluctuating in the sense that the road price is equal to t" (fl) when state 0 (state 1)
prevails.l'' To analytically present the welfare-maximising model-where welfare is
measured as the sum of the individuals' private benefits minus the sum of their
private costs-we have to consider three situations:
(1) some of the travellers acquire information;
(2) all travellers acquire information;
(3) no information is available.
3.1.1. System optimum; situation1: some travellers acquire information. First,
let us assume that inequality [15] holds true. This implies that travellers in the
interval [0, Ni] are not acquiring information. Only, for drivers in segment [Ni, N~]
it is beneficial to buy information. In order to realise the welfare-maximising traffic
9 Due to limited political feasibility, there are only a few sites where a road pricing scheme has
been implemented. For arguments pro and contra road pricing, we refer to the publications by
Borins (1988), Emmerink et al., (1995a), Evans (1992), Giuliano (1992), Goodwin (1989), Grieco and
Jones (1994), Hills and Evans (1993), Johansson and Mattsson (1995), Jones (1991), Small (1992).
10 Of course, the statie model with fluctuating fees depending on the actual state is an abstraction
from reality. A dynamic model with time-dependent fluctuating fees would be more realistic.
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scheme, the regulator is faced with the following maximisation problem:
(21)
subject to
The integral term provides the area under the inverse demand curve. The term
1!(N~ - Ni) in the objective function gives the costs of information, while the
uncertainty cost component is multiplied by the number of road users faced with
uncertainty: Ni. The two restrictions ensure that information is allocated in an
individually rational manner. Apart from the incorporation of the fluctuating road
price, the restrictions are similar to expressions [16] and [17]. The second restrietion
implies that driver Ni is indifferent between either always using the network or
buying information and using the network in state 0 only; the first restrietion implies
that driver N~ is indifferent between either never using the network or buying
information and using the network in state 0 only. The optimal fluctuating fees f O
and fl can be solved for by using the technique of Lagrange, yielding:
(22)
The first terms on the right-hand side of [22] reflect the traditional extemal
congestion costs of road traffic. The second term then represents the extemal costs
of uncertainty imposed on the road users in the interval [0,Ni]. This additional
term decreases the value of f Oand increases the value of fl in order to diminish
the fluctuations in travel time, and hence the external costs of uncertainty.
3.1.2. System optimum: situation 2: all travellers acquire information. Next,
assume that inequality [18] holds true, implying that all users of the network are
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acquiring information. The regulator then faces maximisation problem [23]:
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(23)
subject to
(1- p). (D(N~) - a·CO(N~) - fO) = TT
a·Cl(Ni) +fl =D(NJ)
The term TTNJ, in the objective function reflects the costs of information, while the
restrictions ensure individually rational behaviour. Maximisation problem [23] can
be solved using the technique of Lagrange. The optimal fluctuating fees are:
(24) F'> a·CO'(NJ,)·NJ,
fl = a·C l ' ( Ni) ·Ni
which is the traditional expression for the optimal (first-best) congestion prices.
Clearly, uncertainty does not play a role in these expressions, since none of the
drivers in the network faces uncertainty costs as everyone is acquiring information.
3.1.3. System optimum; situation 3: no information available. Finally, let us
assume that the costs of information (TT) are relatively high. Then it might be
optimal from a system point of view to supply none of the drivers with information.
In such a situation, the network regulator faces the problem of finding the system
optimum of model N (see also Section 2.1):
(25) mr foNND(X) dx - (1 - p). (X. CO(NN) 'NN - v (X'C1(NN) 'NN
- f3vp(l-p) ·(Cl(NN) - CO(NN))·NN
subject to
a·(l-p)·CO(NN) +p·Cl(NN))
+ f3Vp(l- p) . (Cl(NN) - CO(NN)) + f=D(NN)
Using the technique of Lagrange, the optimal flat fee f has the following form:
(26) f= a· (1- p). CO'(NN) +p ·Cl'(NN)) ·NN
+ f3. Vp(l - p) (Cl' (NN) - CO' (NN)) .NN
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The first term on the right-hand side of [26] denotes the expected extemal conges-
tion costs; the second term reflects the external uncertainty costs.
Depending both on the functional forms of the demand and travel time functions,
and on the values of the parameters, one of the three situations discussed above
yields the system optimum for the transport network. In the next section, the
welfare-improving properties of information provision are compared with welfare
levels under system optimum (first-best) behaviour.
3.2. Relative Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Provision. The im-
pact of information on the relative efficiency of road usage will be measured using
the performance measure io, defined as (Arnott et al., 1991; Verhoef et al., 1995):
(27) Welfare ( EndogenousInformation) - Welfare ( Nonintervention)w= Welfare ( System Optimum) - Welfare ( Nonintervention)
Welfare(Endogenous Information) denotes the amount of welfare generated by model
E (Section 2.4), while Welfaret'Noninteroention) represents welfare under model N
(no information available, Section 2.1). t» then provides the achievable welfare gains
as a proportion of the theoretically possible welfare gains. Clearly, t» cannot exceed
the value of one. In addition, t» cannot be smaller than zero, since it was shown in
Proposition 1 that endogenous provision of information leads to a strict Pareto
improvement, implying that the numerator of t» cannot take on negative values.
Various experiments have been conducted to assess the impact of key parameters
of the model on the relative efficiency of information provision. Similar to the
specifications underlying the propositions in Section 2, the functional form of the
demand function used in the experiments is given by D(N) = d - aN; the link travel
time functions are specified as Ci(N) = k i + biN (j = 0,1).
In previous papers, casts related to uncertainty were not included in the gener-
alised cost function, that is, f3 was assumed to be equal to zero. Figure 4, however,
shows that the inclusion of uncertainty costs strongly influences the relative effi-
ciency of information provision.!' The more important the uncertainty costs compo-
nent, the higher the efficiency of information provision. Hence, the results obtained
in previous work provide a lower bound for the potential efficiency gains of
information; the positive impacts of information are underestimated when costs of
uncertainty are ignored.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the impacts of information provision to travellers were analysed
using a stochastic equilibrium concept. Previous work was advanced by including an
additional term related to the costs of travel time uncertainty into the generalised
11 The following parameters were used to produce Figure 4: d = 50, a = 0.015, p = 0.25,
k O = k l = 20, bO = 0.015, bI = 0.04, a = 1, "TT = 2.
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FIGURE4
RELATIVE WELFARE IMPROVEMENT AS A FUNCTION OF THE VALUE-OF-UNCERTAINTY( f3 )
cost function. Costs of uncertainty have frequently been mentioned as being impor-
tant in the travel behaviour literature, particularly with respect to driver information
systems.
Pour models were discussed. It was proven that for realistic values of the
value-of-uncertainty parameter ({3), information is beneficial to both the informed
and uninformed drivers, that is, information will lead to a strict Pareto improve-
ment. Por exceptionally large {3-values however, exogenous provision of information
(model P) might negatively affect the uninformed drivers.
The relative efficiency of endogenous information provision (model E) was
analysed, using the system optimal welfare level as a benchmark. System optimal
welfare can be achieved by means of a fluctuating (depending on the level of
congestion) road pricing scheme. With the inclusion of costs related to uncertainty,
the optimal fluctuating road price depends on both the external congestion costs and
the external uncertainty costs. Experiments revealed that the larger the costs of
uncertainty, the more attractive information is as a policy option to optimise traffic
flows.
There are plenty of promising future research directions; we will mention four of
these. Pirst, it would be interesting to consider a heterogenous group of traveIlers,
that is, with value-of-time and value-of-uncertainty parameters differing throughout
the population. Second, the application of the stochastic equilibrium principle is
limited to a simple transport network; the model would considerably gain in realism
if more complex networks were dealt with. Third, the present analysis has ignored
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the additional beneficial effect that information provision might reduce drivers'
perceptual errors regarding traffic conditions. In our model we have assumed that
potential road users are perfectly aware of average network conditions. It is not
directly obvious what the consequences of relaxing this assumption are. Finally, the
models discussed above are statie in nature, and it is a major future challenge to
apply this stochastic equilibrium concept to a dynamic model as weIl. This would
require both advanced mathematical techniques and enormous computing power.
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